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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Roger Wilson appeals from an order modifying the 
conditions of his supervised release to require that he undergo 
a mental health assessment and, if necessary, participate in an 
approved mental health treatment program.  This case requires 
us to decide whether Wilson’s waiver of appeal bars his 
appeal of an order modifying the terms and conditions of 
supervised release.  We conclude that it does not and, 
therefore, will affirm.   
 
I. Background  
 Wilson pleaded guilty to two drug charges.  The plea 
agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal or 
collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence except in 
the event that the government appealed, the sentence 
exceeded the applicable statutory limits set forth in the United 
States Code, or the sentence unreasonably exceeded the 
sentencing guideline range determined by the District Court.  
 
 On January 8, 2008, Wilson was sentenced to sixty-
five months’ imprisonment to be followed by six years of 
supervised release.  He appealed, but we found his appellate 
waiver valid and found, as well, that the issues raised on 
appeal were within the scope of the waiver.  We, thus, 
enforced the waiver and affirmed the judgment of sentence.  
United States v. Wilson, 337 F. App’x 155, 156 (3d Cir. 
2009).  On December 1, 2011, Wilson was released from 
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prison and commenced his term of supervised release.1
 
  Three 
months later, his Probation Officer filed an application to 
modify the terms and conditions of his supervised release to 
include participation in a mental health program.  The District 
Court held a hearing at which Wilson’s Probation Officer 
testified about a number of bizarre incidents which raised 
concerns as to Wilson’s mental state, and about his grandiose 
ideas and acts of unconventional behavior.  Wilson also 
testified, and, in the process, did little or nothing to help 
himself.  On March 14, 2012, the Court ordered that Wilson’s 
conditions of supervised release be modified to add the 
condition that he undergo a mental health assessment and, if 
necessary, participate in an approved mental health treatment 
program.  Wilson timely appealed.     
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “Where, as here, the government invokes 
an appellate-waiver provision contained in a defendant’s plea 
agreement, we must determine as a threshold matter whether 
the appellate waiver prevents us from exercising our 
jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant’s appeal.”  
United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 533–37 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). The validity and scope of an appellate waiver 
involves a question of law and is, therefore, reviewed de 
novo.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Should we exercise jurisdiction over the merits of the 
appeal, we “review challenges to the imposition of a special 
condition of supervised release, as well as a district court’s 
decision to modify the terms of release, for abuse of 
discretion.” United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 716 
                                                 
1 Wilson was initially released in May of 2011 to Renewal 
Center, a community confinement center.  However, after 
threatening staff members and violating several of Renewal’s 
rules, Wilson was returned to prison. 
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(3d Cir. 2006)). 
 
III.  Analysis 
A. Appellate Waiver  
 Before reaching the merits, we must decide whether 
the appellate waiver before us bars this appeal.  We will 
enforce an appellate waiver and decline to review the merits 
of an appeal “where ‘we conclude (1) that the issues [the 
defendant] pursues on appeal fall within the scope of his 
appellate waiver and (2) that he knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed to the appellate waiver, unless (3) enforcing the waiver 
would work a miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. 
Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Corso, 549 
F.3d at 927).  
 
 The government correctly observes that the word 
“sentence” in a broad appellate waiver such as that now 
before us includes the terms and conditions of supervised 
release and, therefore, bars appeals challenging those terms 
and conditions.  See, e.g., Goodson, 544 F.3d at 538 (“[T]he 
duration, as well as the conditions of supervised release are 
components of a sentence.  By waiving his right to take a 
direct appeal of his sentence, [the defendant] waived his right 
to challenge the conditions of his supervised release, which 
were by definition part of his sentence.”).  But Wilson’s 
appeal does not challenge the initial terms and conditions of 
supervised release imposed at sentencing.  Rather, Wilson’s 
appeal challenges a post-sentencing order modifying those 
terms and conditions.   
 
 The government argues that under the principles of res 
judicata, we must decline to reach the merits of the instant 
appeal.  We reject that argument.  To do as the government 
argues would require us to enforce an appellate waiver as to 
an issue we have not yet determined falls within the scope of 
the waiver.  To be sure, our prior holding that the waiver was 
valid, i.e., that it was made knowingly and voluntarily, is 
given preclusive effect.  We must still, however, decide 
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whether the scope of that valid waiver encompasses the merits 
of the appeal now before us such that Wilson can or cannot 
appeal from the order that modified the conditions of his 
supervised release.   
 
 We have not spoken on this issue, but the Courts of 
Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that an 
appeal from an order modifying conditions of supervised 
release2
 
 under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) falls outside the scope 
of a broad appellate waiver and, therefore, is not barred.  See 
United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1302 (10th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845, 846 (11th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam); cf. Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1301–02 (citing 
analogous cases from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits holding that a general waiver of 
a defendant’s appellate rights does not encompass a later 
appeal of an order modifying the term of imprisonment under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582).   
 We are persuaded by the reasoning of our sister 
circuits.  A defendant would not reasonably contemplate that 
a broad, general waiver of appellate rights with respect to the 
judgment of sentence would foreclose appeals of later-
imposed conditions of supervised release. See Lonjose, 663 
F.3d at 1298 (differentiating the right to directly appeal the 
sentence memorialized in the judgment and commitment 
order, inclusive of the original term of imprisonment and 
terms and conditions of supervised release, from the separate 
and distinct right to appeal a subsequent modification of the 
terms of imprisonment or supervised release that could be 
                                                 
2 This appeal involves a modification sought by the 
government, not the defendant.  Courts have held that an 
appeal from a denial of a defendant’s motion under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(2) to modify the terms of supervised release 
imposed as part of the original sentence falls within the scope 
of the defendant’s appellate waiver.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Scallon, 683 F.3d 680, 681 (5th Cir. 2012).   Holding 
otherwise would permit an end run around the waiver.   
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imposed months, if not years, later).  It might well be 
different, of course, were a waiver to use more specific 
language, i.e., language specifically addressing a defendant’s 
right to appeal modifications of his sentence or the terms and 
conditions of his supervised release.  Id. at 1300 n.9 (citing 
cases involving “[m]ore comprehensive, detailed, and 
unambiguous appellate waivers [that] have been held to 
preclude appeals of sentence modifications”); Carruth, 528 
F.3d at 846 (“There was no specific language in the original 
plea waiver indicating that Carruth’s willingness to waive his 
right to appeal from a sentence entered in accordance with the 
original plea was also a waiver of his right to appeal from his 
future supervised release revocation.”).    
 
 Wilson’s appellate waiver can reasonably be 
understood to encompass, as relevant here, only a waiver of 
his right to appeal his “sentence,” that is, what was imposed at 
sentencing and memorialized in the judgment and 
commitment order.  See Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1300.  Wilson 
did not explicitly waive a right to appeal a later modification 
of his “sentence” and such a waiver cannot be presumed or 
inferred.  Accordingly, we hold that this appeal falls outside 
the scope of, and is, therefore, not barred by, the waiver. 
 
B. The Modification Order    
  Proceeding to the merits of the appeal, we review for 
abuse of discretion the District Court’s order modifying the 
conditions of Wilson’s supervised release to require him to 
undergo a mental health evaluation and receive mental health 
treatment, if necessary.  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 
234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008).  District courts possess broad 
discretionary authority to modify the terms and conditions of a 
defendant’s supervised release and, accordingly, 
modifications are reviewed only for reasonableness.  Pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), “a court may, after considering the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), modify, reduce, or 
enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior 
to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised 
release.”  Murray, 692 F.3d at 278.  The § 3553(a) factors 
include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 
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history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for 
adequate deterrence, the defendant’s medical needs, and the 
protection of the public.  In accordance with Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32.1(c), a district court must afford the 
defendant a hearing, unless the defendant waives this right or 
the modification is favorable to the defendant and is not met 
with objection by the government.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c).  
We also “requir[e] that district courts explain and justify 
conditions of supervised release.”  United States v. Miller, 
594 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
 Wilson’s one-page pro se brief merely states that the 
order of the District Court “has to be dismissed according to 
the U.S. Constitution,” without stating why.  We see utterly 
no reason to do so.  Wilson received a full and fair hearing in 
accordance with Rule 32.1,3
 
 and meaningful consideration 
was given by the Court to the § 3553(a) factors.  The Court 
concluded that a mental health evaluation and, if necessary, 
mental health treatment, were necessary to protect the public 
against possible harm; “at the very least there [are] reasonable 
grounds to believe that [Wilson] may not be in complete 
touch with reality, certainly to the extent that he may possibly 
commit additional crimes or, perhaps, be a danger to himself 
or others in the community.” App. at 84.     
IV.  Conclusion 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering a modification of the conditions of Wilson’s 
supervised release.  Accordingly, we will affirm.   
 
 
                                                 
3 We note that the order “requiring Wilson undergo a mental 
health assessment and, if necessary, participate in a mental 
health treatment program approved by the probation officer 
until such time as defendant is released from the program by 
the Court” is not an impermissible delegation of judicial 
authority to the United States Probation Office.  See United 
States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 2010). 
